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Reflections on Leading Issues in Civil Rights,
Then and Now
Jack Greenberg *
As social changes with regard to race-relations have occurred in
the United States, legal changes have preceded or followed, each to
some extent influencing the other. 'But, of course, more than law has
affected how race relations have developed, just as more than race
relations has had to be taken into account in formulating legal doc-
trines. Nevertheless, it is of some interest to isolate some of the prin-
cipal lines of the legal development of civil rights and observe their
relationship, or non-relationship, to underlying social reality. To
perform the task comprehensively would require an encyclopedic in-
quiry into American history and law. But.even a survey into a few
areas provides interesting insights.
I shall, therefore, examine four constitutional or legal lines of
growth, two of them historical and two contemporary. They are the
evolution of the law of state action from post-Reconstruction to the
late 1960's when in demonstration cases it reached a plateau, the de-
velopment from Plesgy v. Ferguson's' separate-but-equal doctrine to
Brown v. Board of Education,2 the present day, unfinished mixed statu-
tory-constitutional struggle over discriminatory effect versus discrimi-
natory intent and the debate over affirmative action.
I. The Development of the "State Action" Doctrine
The original civil rights law of the United States was the Thir-
teenth Amendment which outlaws slavery, the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, which so far as relevant to this discussion prohibits states from
denying due process and equal protection of the laws, and the Fif-
teenth Amendment which prohibits racial discrimination in voting.
The early civil rights statutes attempted to secure equality in civil,
commercial, and property relationships, in the criminal justice sys-
* Director Counsel, NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund, Inc. This article is
the text of the tenth annual Notre Dame Civil Rights lecture given at Notre Dame Law
School.
1 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
2 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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tem and against certain categories of violence.3
This complex of statutes and amendments gave rise to the "state
action" issue, which was posed by language in the Fourteenth
Amendment stating that:
No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the priv-
ileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any
State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the
equal protection of the laws.4
State action received its first significant treatment by the Supreme
Court of the United States in the Civil Rights Cases5 involving the
Civil Rights Act of 1875 which attempted to assure access to various
public accommodations without regard to race.6 The seven consoli-
dated cases involved blacks who were denied admission to a hotel,
theaters, an opera house and a railroad. The Supreme Court ruled
the legislation unconstitutional because it prohibited discrimination
by private persons and was not limited to state action. The Court
ruled that Congress was without power to enforce against private dis-
crimination an amendment which spoke in terms of "no state shall."
The Court also rejected the contention that segregation was a vestige
of slavery and that, therefore, the legislation was authorized by the
Thirteenth Amendment, which operates against private conduct.
Justice Bradley's opinion also distinguished between the exercise
of power under the Fourteenth Amendment and congressional au-
thority under the Commerce Clause which, said Bradley, gives Con-
gress direct power of legislation over commerce. The Court made no
effort to consider whether the 1875 Civil Rights Act might be sus-
tained on that basis. In any event, the state of Commerce Clause
jurisprudence in 1883 was such that this claim may not have pre-
vailed, except with regard to rail travel, with which one of the cases
dealt.
Just as the state action concept invalidated the 1875 public ac-
commodations act, it also debilitated other civil rights legislation of
the same period. Some of the Reconstruction statutes themselves re-
quired proof of state action. Section 242 of Title 18 of the United
States Code makes it a crime to deprive a person of rights "under
3 For a survey of the early interpretation of reconstruction civil rights legislation, see M.
KoNvTz, THE CONSTrrTION AND CIVIL RIGHTS (1947).
4 U. S. CONST. am'end. xiv, § I (emphasis added).
5 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
6 S'eid at 9.
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color of any. . . statute. . .. ,,7 Legislation forbidding inequality in
the right to own property and make contracts remained largely unen-
forced against private discrimination until 1968 when it was held, in
Jones v. Mayyer Co., 8 to be applicable against private persons as a valid
enforcement of the Thirteenth Amendment. Until then, it was
widely thought that Congress could forbid only discriminatory state
action, not private conduct. Efforts to enforce voting rights also were
hobbled by the state action limitation. Grovey v. Townsend 9 held that
the exclusion of blacks from the Democratic party of Texas was no
violation of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments because the
party acted privately and not pursuant to state law.
Thius, as a matter of constitutional and statutory interpretation,
the state action doctrine largely impeded federal enforcement of civil
rights. With slight exception, the national government could not
compel individuals to cease discriminating except when they some-
how acted for the state. Despite what could be done against the
widespread discrimination which constituted state action (and en-
forcement against this was usually lacking), privately inflicted dis-
crimination was sufficient to make the lives of most black citizens
irremediably second class. While in theory the states could act
against discrimination, in fact they acted hardly at all. 10
The state action doctrine developed not in terms of dispensing
with the requirement that it be present, but rather by finding state
action to exist in circumstances where, earlier, it had been deemed to
be nonexistent. Two important milestones on the way to modern
state action doctrine were Marsh v. AlabamaI and Shelley v. Kraemer.' 2
Marsh held that a privately owned company town could not, under
the First Amendment, prosecute Jehovah's Witnesses for trespass for
having entered into the town contrary to its prohibition. The "pri-
vate" property was in a constitutional sense governmental. Sheller
held that courts were forbidden by the Fourteenth Amendment to
enforce restrictive covenants which prohibited a property owner from
selling to blacks. Judicial enforcement of state-created private rights
7 18 U.S.C. § 242 (1976).
8 392 U.S. 409 (1968).
9 295 U.S. 45 (1935). The voting cases developed their own characterizations of state
action. The cases which perhaps definitively set forth the doctrine in this area were Smith v.
Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944) and Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953).
10 For early cases on state power to prohibit private discrimination, see Railway Mail
Ass'n v. Corsi, 326 U.S. 88 (1945) and Bob-Lo Excursion Co. v. Michigan, 333 U.S. 28 (1948).
11 326 U.S. 501 (1946).
12 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
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was forbidden state action. These decisions suggested that, while the
Fourteenth Amendment, in terms, is limited to action of the state, it
could also be applied to certain private conduct which involved the
state.
Other cases gently pushed the perimeter of the concept slightly
outward. 13 But the state action concept entered its period of greatest
challenge in the 1960's, the period of the sit-in demonstrations and
freedom rides. Those who argued that the Fourteenth Amendment
prohibited convicting blacks of trespass for sitting in at lunch coun-
ters from which they had been excluded because of race claimed that
it was unconstitutional for the state to enforce an owner's racial pref-
erence. The ultimate assertion of these plaintiffs was that property
does not consist of things or land but, rather, of relationships among
persons with regard to things enforceable by the state. As a conse-
quence, state enforcement of a private property owner's racial choice
constituted state action. The real issue was whether that aspect of
property which constituted exclusion of blacks was to be so highly
valued that it deserved protection against blacks' claims to be free of
discrimination. While virtually all the trespass convictions were re-
versed, this particular argument never prevailed. It was picked up in
a few concurring opinions, but was resisted vigorously by those who
favored convicting the demonstrators as well as by many who sup-
ported them.
In 1961, the first of the sit-in cases, Garner v. Louzsiana 14 and com-
panion cases, were reversed on the ground that there was no evidence
that defendants had disturbed the peace. The state action question,
that is, whether the arrest and conviction to enforce racial discrimi-
nation violated the equal protection clause, was not decided.' 5 In
1963, the Court reversed a series of trespass convictions on the
ground that in the communities where the cases arose city ordinances
required racial segregation in public accommodations.' 6 In two of
those cases, one arising from New Orleans 7 and another from Dur-
13 See Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958); Pennsylvania v. Board of Directors of City
Trusts, 353 U.S. 230 (1957); Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249 (1953); Terry v. Adams, 345
U.S. 461 (1953); American Communications Ass'n v. Doubs, 339 U.S. 382 (1950). All of
these cases suggested or held that deeds which in some sense were private, in a constitutional
sense, were or could be state action because of a close nexus between private and state
conduct.
14 368 U.S. 157 (1961).
15 See 368 U.S. at 176 (Douglas, J., concurring).
16 Peterson v. City of Greenville, 373 U.S. 244 (1963); Gober v. City of Birmingham, 373
U.S. 374 (1963).
17 Lombard v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. 267 (1963).
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ham, North Carolina, 18 there was no evidence in the record of such
city ordinances. Nevertheless, in the former, the Court held that a
pro-segregationist threat of the police chief amounted to the same
thing. And in the latter, counsel had asserted that such an ordinance
existed although there was no evidence of it in the record. The Court
vacated for reconsideration in the light of cases where there had been
such a showing.
In subsequent cases, the Supreme Court continued to finesse the
issue of whether arrest and conviction to sustain a proprietor's racial
segregation constituted state action. Gffinz v. Magland'9 held that
although an amusement park was private, sufficient state action ex-
isted because the private guard who ordered Negroes to leave the
premises was also a deputy sheriff. Thus, the order to leave came
from a "state" not a private source. Barr v. City of Columbia2 ° was
decided on no evidence grounds. Boule v. City of Columbia2' held that
a South Carolina trespass statute had been applied contrary to the
Fourteenth Amendment because, under prior state decisions, trespass
constituted only initial entry on premises after notice to stay off, not
refusal to leave after having entered with permission. There was,
therefore, an unconstitutionally retroactive interpretation of the law,
which did not give fair warning. Robinson v. Florida22 reversed an-
other conviction because Florida Board of Health regulations requir-
ing segregated toilets had the same effect as the segregation
ordinances in the 1963 cases.23
Many other cases were vacated for reconsideration in the light of
the preceding decisions. Throughout all of this, the Court steadfastly
declined to faee the bedrock Fourteenth Amendment state action is-
sue. Finally, after all the demonstration convictions which could be
decided on other grounds or on conventional state action grounds
had been reversed, the only ones left were those which posed the ba-
sic question. Bell v. Magyland24 was a sit-in case in which there was no
insufficiency of evidence; the statute was not vague; there was no
segregation ordinance or similar Board of Health regulation; and
there were no unexpected departures in judicial interpretation. At
the last moment, however, a deus ex machina appeared. The state of
18 Advent v. North Carolina, 373 U.S. 375 (1963).
19 378 U.S. 130 (1964).
20 Id at 146.
21 Id at 347.
22 Id at 153.
23 See notes 16 to 18 supra.
24 378 U.S. 226 (1964).
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Maryland, while the case was pending, adopted legislation prohibit-
ing segregation in public accommodations. The Supreme Court, in
an opinion by Justice Brennan, referred to the doctrine of abatement,
which none of the parties had argued, briefed, or even suggested.
That doctrine provides that if a criminal statute is repealed while the
conviction is pending on appeal, the conviction should be vacated.
Brennan asked whether the passage of antidiscrimination legislation
in Maryland was not the equivalent of repeal of the trepass statute
and sent the case back to the Maryland courts to consider that
question.
In the meantime, the Civil Rights Act of 196425 was enacted by
the Congress and signed by the President. It prohibited exclusion
from public accommodations on the basis of race. In Hamm v. City of
Rock Hill,2 6 the Court held that the federal statute had the effect of
abating the state convictions, because if the federal statute had been
in effect at the time defendants went upon the property, they would
have been committing no crime. With the passage of the Civil
Rights Act, consideration of the hardcore state action issue came to
an end. While state action questions continue to arise, none probe so
deeply the question of the relation between state and the individual.
The state action doctrine addressed the extent to which the na-
tional government could control individual discrimination by attrib-
uting to it state-like qualities. A classical view held that without
overt formal state involvement, such conduct is private and immune
from constitutional prohibition. As time went on, conduct which
once would have been held private was in some cases characterized
as that of the state. But the courts declined to give constitutional
significance to the ultimate, underlying state support for all asser-
tions of rights which exist in any society other than an anarchy. And
Congress, joining in evasion of the issue of how far its authority to
prohibit private discrimination extended under the Fourteenth
Amendment, rested the public accommodation portion of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 at least in part on the Commerce Clause.2 7
Several factors which may have affected the evolution of this
doctrine are worth noting. First, despite the North's triumph in the
Civil War and assertion of national paramountcy over state's rights
with regard to race, the momentum of racial prejudice and discrimi-
25 Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (codified at 42 U.S.C.
§§ 2000a-2000n (1976)).
26 379 U.S. 306 (1964).
27 See Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 249-62 (1964).
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nation remained strong. Although overt state involvement in dis-
crimination could not be tolerated under the explicit language of the
Fourteenth Amendment, the country obviously was not yet ready to
legally disapprove the underlying, less conspicuous state complicity.
The national government was tolerant of state involvement at all but
the surface level and, in this toleration, allowed individuals to dis-
criminate without governmental interference. In this tolerance, a
classical liberalism coincided with an early view of federalism, both
leading to the same result.2 8 Bentham and James and John Stuart
Mill had asserted that the highest degree of liberty would be
achieved in states where there was the least amount of governmental
interference with private choice. Similarly, early state action doc-
trine permitted private discrimination without governmental inter-
ference. But as society became more complex, John Mill himself and
later T.H. Green recognized that in some situations, government in-
action was a form of action itself. Private activity could stifle the
freedom of the weak and state interference was necessary to assure
greater personal freedom. This latter perception may be seen in de-
veloped state action doctrine, which provided a means of controlling
discriminatory conduct.
As national hegemony over the states grew after the 1930's, the
federalism concern abated. As a national policy concerning race be-
gan to turn against discrimination, tolerance of the individual's right
to discriminate weighed less in the equation. But the factor of indi-
vidual autonomy against the state continued to, and still does, weigh
heavily. It may be that if state action doctrine only affected race,
private action by now might all but be equated with state action.
But the law requires a certain degree of consistency. If the underly-
ing state involvement in protection of property were sufficient state
action to invoke the Fourteenth Amendment's equal protection
clause, other, perhaps undesirable, outcomes might be suggested for
non-racial situations. For example, must an employer give a due
process hearing to an employee before discharging him or her? Need
a parent treat all children equally or be required to justify unequal
treatment? May a householder invite to a barbeque all his neighbors
except some who might be excluded arbitrarily, or perhaps because
of race or religion? Answers to these questions have been suggested
by Louis Henkin and Charles L. Black, Jr.29 Basically, they have
28 On early liberalism see, J. GREENBERG, RACE RELATIONS AND AMERICAN LAW 48-49
(1959).
29 See Black, Foreword- 'State Action," Equal Protection, and Califomiza Proposition 14, 81
[Vol. 57:625]
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proposed that the grave unacceptablity of racial discrimination and
personal privacy be the delimiting factors. A householder or family
member dealing with others in his family might invoke the counter-
vailing consideration of privacy, but the owner of a public restaurant
might not. But this would require breaking new ground, with per-
haps unforeseen consequences, which did not have to be plowed. It
was perhaps possible for demonstrators to win their cases on limited
grounds.
As discrimination slowly eroded, the role of pirivacy never had to
be put to the test because the reason for so doing disappeared. Be-
tween 1964 and 1968, a hundred years after adoption of Reconstruc-
tion legislation, public accommodations, employment, and housing
all became covered by the civil rights legislation of the mid '60's,
which prohibited private racial discrimination. Because the legisla-
tion was bottomed on the Commerce Clause as well as the Four-
teenth Amendment, the state action issue did not have to be and was
not addressed. Moreover, the Reconstruction Civil Rights Acts inter-
preted in jones v. Mayer Co. were for the first time held to cover
private property and contractual relations. That legislation imple-
mented the Thirteenth Amendment, which has no state action re-
quirement. Therefore, while the state action issue continues to be
litigated in cases of lesser consequence, no fundamental jurispruden-
tial debate of the magnitude of that of the '60's continues.
II. From "Separate But Equal" to "Integration"
Not long ago after the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment,
the Supreme Court in Strauder v. West Virginia,31 using language
which sounds quite modern, struck down a statute excluding blacks
from juries on the ground that it imposed a brand of inferiority upon
them. But the definitive 19th Century pronouncement on segrega-
tion was Plessy v. Ferguson32 which became the bedrock of racial segre-
gation until 1954. Plessy loomed so large that until Brown v. Board of
Education33 was decided, civil rights efforts were directed almost en-
tirely to destroying Plessy or finding ways around it. Today Plessy is
no more than a footnote in constitutional law textbooks. It is per-
haps a curiosity that the only bright spot in Pless,, Justice Harlan's
HARv. L. REv. 69, 94-95 (1967); Henkin, Shelley v. Kraemer; Nolesfor a Revised Opinion, 110
U. PA. L. REv. 473 (1962).
30 392 U.S. 409 (1968).
31 100 U.S. 303 (1880).
32 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
33 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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dissent stating that "our constitution is color blind, '34 is today often
cited by those who are opposed to affirmative action for blacks.
On the pages of the Supreme Court reports, the long road up
from Plessy to Brown is one of legalistic formalism. It is written in
terms of stare decdz , the technicalities of pleading, constitutional his-
tory, syllogistic jousting, reductio ad absurdum and other forensic tech-
niques. But underneath it all, there was the substantive issue of race
relations. Because Plesjy is not read much anymore it is worth recal-
ling the debate between the majority and dissenting opinions. The
majority rejected the notion that segregation is a vestige of slavery
and therefore prohibited by the Thirteenth Amendment. That prop-
osition, it was said, runs the slavery argument into the ground. Jus-
tice Harlan, in dissent, retorted that the Thirteenth Amendment did
not permit the withholding or deprivation of any right inhering in
freedom and that the amendment struck down badges of slavery or
servitude.
The majority took a look at the precedents and rejected the
principle ofStrauder v. West Virginia,35 on the ground that it dealt with
the political right to serve on juries, and not with the social right to
ride in a non-segregated railroad coach. Justice Harlan, on the other
hand, looked at the language of Strauder which condemned exclusion
of blacks from juries as "practically a brand upon them, affixed by
the law; an assertion of their inferiority, and a stimulant to. . . race
prejudice" 36 and viewed it as controlling.
The majority found support for railroad segregation in a school
segregation case, Roberts v. City of Boston,s7. decided by the Supreme
Judicial Court of Massachusetts before the adoption of the Four-
teenth Amendment. Justice Harlan pointed out that Roberts was a
school, not a railroad case, and had been decided before adoption of
the amendment. It therefore was not significant in a Fourteenth
Amendment case involving travel.
Majority and dissent debated the implication of a decision up-
holding segregation: for example, whether persons of different hair
color or religions could be segregated, or whether houses on opposite
sides of the street could be required to be painted different colors.
Justice Harlan had argued that those consequences would flow from
upholding segregation; the 'majority said such regulations would be
34 163 U.S. at 559 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
35 100 U.S. 303 (1980).
36 Id at 308.
37 59 Mass. (5 Cush.) 198 (1849).
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unreasonable while racial segregation in railroad coaches was reason-
able. Finally, the majority held that if segregation made blacks feel
inferior, that was a function of their own minds; whites in similar
circumstances, it was asserted, would not feel the same way. The
Court urged that law could not affect prejudice.
Between 1899 and 1927, civil rights lawyers tried to overturn
Plessy in a number of cases. Cumming v. Board of Educaton38 involved
an effort to enjoin collecting taxes for a white high school in Augusta,
Georgia because the black school had been closed. The Court held
that the relief sought by plaintiffs was inappropriate because a court
should not close a school, and that the attack on segregation should
have been made in the pleadings. In Berea College v. Kentucky, 39 the
conviction of the University of Kentucky for having admitted black
students in violation of the state segregation law was upheld on the
ground that a state may regulate corporations.
In Gong Lum v. Rice,40 the Court faced the issue of whether a
child of Chinese descent properly could complain about being segre-
gated into a black school. She objected to being segregated with
blacks because she wanted to be segregated with whites. Three Jus-
tices widely viewed as enlightened liberals, Stone, Holmes and Bran-
deis, joined the unanimous opinion holding racial segregation in
education as beyond question, citing as authority Plessy and Roberts.
By the beginning of the 1930's, the validity of racial segregation, in
virtually all aspects of American law, seemed to be settled.
There was, however, a substantial strain of authority holding
that in some circumstances segregation was prohibited. Strauder v.
West Virginia4' remained good law, at least as to jury service. In
1917, Buchanan v. Warl 42 held that a city ordinance dividing a com-
munity into black and white sections denied property without due
process of law. The case involved a white property owner who had
been prevented from selling to blacks. Most important, in 1886 the
Court had decided a case which has had enormous influence, Yick Wo
v. Hopkins.43 It held that a San Francisco ordinance prohibiting the
operation of laundries in wooden buildings denied equal protection
of the laws because almost all the laundries in wooden buildings were
operated by Chinese. Moreover, white laundry operators had ob-
38 175 U.S. 528 (1899).
39 211 U.S. 45 (1908).
40 275 U.S. 78 (1927).
41 100 U.S. 303 (1880).
42 245 U.S. 60 (1917).
43 118 U.S. 356 (1886).
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tained some exemptions from the law while Chinese had not. The
seminal language of Yick Wo was:
Though the law itself be fair on its face and impartial in ap-
pearance, yet, if it is applied and administered by public authority
with an evil eye and an unequal hand, so as practically to make
unjust and illegal discriminations between persons in similar cir-
cumstances, material to their rights, the denial of equal justice is
still within the prohibition of the Constitution."
In the early 1930's, a small group of lawyers including William
H. Hastie and Charles H. Houston undertook to reconcile the two
competing strains of authority with the aim of destroying the legal
basis of racial segregation. After toying with the idea of bringing a
number of separate-but-equal suits for the purpose of making segre-
gation too expensive to maintain, they rejected that notion because it
would affect only a few places which undoubtedly would soon slip
back into inequality. In a brilliant paper prepared for the group,
Nathan Margold argued that the only proper goal would be to strike
at the heart of the evil itself, racial segregation. He proposed bring-
ing cases based on the theory of Yik Wo, arguing to the courts that
racial segregation always has been accompanied by inequality and
that segregated education inevitably was administered with an une-
ven hand and an evil eye.45
The effort began with a series of cases which today are no more
than .footnotes in constitutional law case books, but -which engaged
the passions of civil rights lawyers for fifteen years. Missouri ex. rel.
Gaines v. Canada46 for the first time held that a state may not have a
law school only for whites and require blacks to leave the state to seek
legal eduication. Spuel v. Board of Regents of the University of Oklahoma47
held that a black applicant for law school, excluded from the white
school, was not furnished equal protection of the laws by a promise to
build an equal law school for her. Sweatt v. Painter48 held'that in
measuring black and white law schools against one another, intangi-
ble factors such as the opportunity to associate with classmates of
another race had to be considered. McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Re-
44 Id at 373-74.
45 For a fuller description of the genesis of the modem effort to secure a ruling that
segregation is unconstitutional, see Greenberg, Litigation for Social Change: Methods, Limits and
Role in Democracy, 29 REc. OF THE AssOc. OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF N.Y. 320 (1974).
46 305 U.S. 337 (1938).
47 332 U.S. 631 (1948).
48 "339 U.S. 629 (1950).
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gents49 held that to segregate black students within the classroom, the
cafeteria and library at the University of Oklahoma Graduate School
of Education denied equal protection because it interfered with the
ability to learn. Finally, in 1954, the Supreme Court in Brown v. Board
of Education repudiated Plessy and held unconstitutional racial seg-
regation in education, ultimately bringing about the invalidation of
all state supported segregation as unconstitutional. The Brown opin-
ion reviewed the arguments of the Plessy majority and rejected them
in light of contemporary experience. Brown's most controversial
passages referred to social scientific evidence of the mental harm in-
flicted by segregation.5 1 Plessy, in dealing with this issue, had rested
on the preconceptions of the Justices. Modern social science cited in
Brown pointed the other way.
During the fifteen year period of Gaines through Brown, the
Court preceeded tentatively, even gingerly. When a writ of manda-
mus was sought against the University of Oklahoma in Fisher v.
Hurst52 because the school's first response to Sipuel was to provide
equality by closing the law school for whites, the Court denied the
application on the ground that there was no record upon which to
base a decision. In Brown, the Court followed its 1954 decision out-
lawing segregation with the 1955 "all deliberate speed" opinion53
which moderated the urgency of the 1954 opinion.
Perhaps one can better understand the uneven course of the de-
velopment of equal protection up to this period by considering what
was going on in the country during this period. In 1947, President
Truman's Committee on Civil Rights set forth a blueprint of what
needed to be done to achieve racial equality in America.54 That doc-
ument, which then appeared to be utopian, called for the abolition of
segregation in public accommodations, education and housing, adop-
tion of a fair employment practices act and a sweeping catalog of
similar reforms. One must remember that Washington, D.C. was at
that time more racially segregated than Johannesburg, South Africa
is today. But the Truman Committee document was a reflection of
enormous changes which had taken place in the United States since
Plessy and even Gong Lum. World War II, a war against Nazi racism,
49 339 U.S. 637 (1950).
50 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
51 Id at 494 n. 11.
52 333 U.S. 147 (1948).
53 Brown v. Board of Education, 349 U.S. 294 (1955).
54 PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS, To SECURE THESE RIGHTS, 153-73
(1947).
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helped bring a new prosperity to the United States, facilitated migra-
tion of large numbers of Southern blacks to other parts of the coun-
try, exposed both blacks and whites who had led insular lives to other
possibilities by travel in the United States and abroad, and created
an additional claim for justice on the part of black citizens who had
fought and died for America. But all President Truman could
achieve was a report. Nevertheless, his Solicitor General supported
the claims of black citizens in the Supreme Court.55 But the courts
proceeded haltingly. There was no legislation. Southern racism and
Southern domination of congressional committees made that
impossible.
While the Supreme Court had the vision to declare an end to
segregation as. governmental policy, it did not have the ability to
change the country's thinking or to compel the country to act differ-
ently. The Brown decision was a legal assertion with moral conse-
quences that began the process of revising America's feeling and
conduct about the race. But even apart from "all deliberate speed,"
it was inevitable that the dynamics of American life and law would
slow down and stretch out social change which would result from
Brown. From such outrageous resistance as the riots of Clay and
Sturgis, Kentucky, Milford, Delaware, and Clinton, Tennessee, to
the insurrection of Little Rock and the violence of New Orleans, deep
and uncontrollable patterns of behavior retarded progress. Smoother
resistance appeared in the form of pupil placement laws, stairstep
integration plans, minority-to-majority transfer plans, freedom of
choice and other tactics which made the realization of school integra-
tion slow and sparse.56
Perhaps worst of all, was the outright refusal by school boards to
comply with Brown, a condition which could not be remedied with-
out litigation, at a time when there were little or no resources to
bring lawsuits. The NAACP Legal Defense Fund had a small
number of lawyers. The Black bar in some Southern states, consisted
of only one lawyer and in others, of a few part-time lawyers. The
United States government not only had no statutory authority but
also no desire to bring school integration cases.57 President Eisen-
55 Se, e.g., Briefs of the Solicitor General of the United States in Sweatt v. Painter, 339
U.S. 629 (1950), and McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents, 339 U.S. 637 (1950).
56 For a fuller description of some of these developments see Resistance Grows; 6 Areas to
Integrate, 2 SOUTHERN SCHOOL NEws (1956): Klanrmen Gather to Plan Integration Fight, 7
SOUTHERN SCHOOL NEWS 13 (1960).
57 See Greenberg, The Supreme Court, Civil Rights and Civil Dissonance, 77 YALE L.J. 1520
(1968).
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hower disapproved of the Brown decision and Congress was so op-
posed that the Senate came within one vote of adopting legislation
which would have stripped the Supreme Court of large parts of its
jurisdiction.58
All of that began to change in 1960 when John F. Kennedy be-
came President. He stated publicly that he approved of the decision
in Brown. The situation began to change further when the demon-
strations of the early 1960's commenced, leading the country to
adopt the civil rights legislation of 1964, 1965 and 1968. 59 That legis-
lation marked the alignment of the Congress, the President, and the
Supreme Court on the issue of racial discrimination. With such na-
tional unity, the country seriously began to address the problem of
race discrimination which until then had been dealt with in a frag-
mentary way and principally by the courts. During all of the period
under discussion, law and society developed from and reenforced
each other.
III. Intent Versus Effect and Affirmative Action: Issues for the
Eighties
Among the vigorously debated civil rights issues of the 1980's,
two are particularly prominent. The first is the question of whether
and when it is necessary to demonstrate discriminatory intent rather
than a discriminatory result. The other is the issue of affirmative
action. In some ways, aspects of one involve aspects of the other.
Intention versus effect first rose to prominence in Palmer v. Thompson60
in which the Supreme Court held that when the city of Jackson, Mis-
sissippi closed five segregated swimming pools rather than desegre-
gating them, it did not violate the Fourteenth Amendment equal
protection clause. The Court reasoned that no matter how discrimi-
natory the city's intention, the effect was to treat blacks and whites
equally. Therefore, Washington v. Davis6 1 was perceived as inconsis-
tent with Palmer when it held that the Fifth Amendment was not
violated by tests given for hiring District of Columbia police officers
which had an adverse impact upon hiring blacks. Mr. Justice White
wrote "Our cases have not embraced the proposition that a law or
other official act, without regard to whether it reflects a racially dis-
58 See H. FRIENDLY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION: A GENERAL VIEW (1973).
59 See Civil Rights Act of 1964, supra note 25, Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-
110, 79 Stat. 437 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971 & 1973 (1976)); Civil Rights Act of 1968,
Pub. L. No. 90-284, 82 Stat. 81 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3619 (1976)).
60 403 U.S. 217 (1971).
61 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
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criminatory purpose, is unconstitutional soley because it has a ra-
cially disproportionate impact. '62 This decision was followed by a
number of cases asserting the same standard. Village of ArlingtonHeights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp.63 held that the village
did not deny equal protection by refusing to rezone a tract of land
from single family to multiple family classification to make it possible
to build racially integrated housing there. The decision held that
plaintiffs had not demonstrated a discriminatory intent. Among
other recent cases reiterating the same standard, the most prominent
is Mobile v. Bolden64 which held that an at-large election system which
diluted the voting strength of Negroes did not violate the Fourteenth
or Fifteenth Amendments or the Voting Rights Act because the out-
come was not a consequence of discriminatory intent.
The requirement that intent be demonstrated has been moder-
ated by at least three different doctrines. The first is that Congress,
by legislation, may adopt a test making proof of discriminatory effect
sufficient. For example, in the very same Arlington Heights case, on
remand following the Supreme Court decision, the lower courts held
that Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act could be invoked upon dem-
onstration of discriminatory effect. 65 And in rn'ggs v. Duke Power Com-
pany,66 Title VII was held to have been violated upon showing that a
test like the one involved in Washington v. Davis67 had a racially dispa-
rate impact. Conversely, a statute might require demonstration of
discriminatory intent, as with regard to the discriminatory operation
of lines of seniority. Section 703h of Title VII immunizes discrimina-
tion effected by seniority from the condemnation of Title VII, absent
proof of discrimatory intent.68
Second, the intent test may be more or less stringent depending
upon what constitutes satisfactory proof of intent. For example, in-
tent might be found in various objective circumstances as in a tort or
criminal cases.69 On the other hand, direct proof of subjective
mental processes might be demanded. Without seeking to adum-
brate the rule of the cases, suffice it to say at this point that the battle
62 Id at 239.
63 429 U.S. 252 (1977).
64 446 U.S. 55 (1980).
65 See Metropolitan Housing Development Corp. v. Village of Arlington Heights, 558
F.2d 1283 (1977) and 469 F. Supp. 836 (1979).
66 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
67 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
68 See International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324 (1977).
69 See, e.g., Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 253 (1976) (Stevens, J., concurring).
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ranges back and forth between these two standards of proof. Finally,
the role of presumptions remains important. When one has demon-
strated discriminatory intent with regard to one aspect of a system, it
has been presumed that such intent has infected the rest of the sys-
tem, unless this presumption can be rebutted. 70
The second great recent battleground of civil rights issues has
been that of affirmative action. The Supreme Court has addressed
the issue deftly, generally upholding the concept while carefully de-
fining the circumstances in which it is appropriate. In DeFunis v. Ode-
gaard7t the Court avoided the issue because DeFunis would have
graduated before his enrollment from law school could have been
affected by a decision. In Regents of the University of California v. Bakke 72
the Court struck down the particular affirmative action program em-
ployed by the University of California because of its rigidity, but in
dictum upheld the general concept of affirmative action so long as it
is not inflexible and is designed to bring racial diversity to a school
for the purpose of enabling students of different backgrounds to learn
from one another. In United Steel Workers v. Weber 73 the Court upheld
a voluntary affirmative action plan for admission to an industrial
training program on the ground that it was not rigid nor permanent,
admitted whites as well as blacks, and was adopted against the back-
ground of prior racial discrimination. In Fullilove v. Klutznick 74 the
Court upheld a ten percent set aside of government contracting busi-
ness for minority contractors on the ground that Congress had the
power to adopt this compensatory measure as a means of dealing
with historic racial discrimination.
The issues of effect versus intent and affirmative action bear in-
teresting relationships to one another. To require proof of intent
could hobble efforts to achieve equality when it is necessary to
demonstrate the existence of a state of mind amounting to racial hos-
tility. On the other hand, if objective, extrinsic factors are sufficient
evidence of intent, the burden may be lighter. There is a resem-
blance here to the state action issue in which the external standard,
state-action, remained constant but its content changed over the
years, so that it was much easier to demonstrate the existence of state
action in the 1960's than in the 1880's. To the extent that a sympa-
thetic concern for racial equality in the future informs judicial deci-
70 See Keyes v. School District No. 1, 413 U.S. 189 (1973).
71 416 U.S. 312 (1974).
72 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
73 443 U.S. 193 (1979).
74 448 U.S. 448 (1980).
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sion making, proof of intent should be easier to establish.
Conversely, a contrary outlook would lead to opposite results. On
the other hand, if all that need be demonstrated is effect, the way to
address racial inequality successfully would be much simpler. Of
course, as Arlington Heights and Fullilove demonstrate, Congress can
simplify the problem by enacting an effects standard.
Both affirmative action and an effects standard are results ori-
ented. In this, their consequences often may be distributive, and not
merely concerned with racial status or stigma. But the distributive
aspect of the effects test and affirmative action is precisely why both
are the focus of so much controversy. The dominant white racial
group, particularly in a time of economic stringency, is reluctant to
give up portions of what it owns to those who possess less. This has
been most clearly demonstrated in the two Supreme Court cases con-
cerning distributive rights, San Antonio School District v. Rodiguez7' and
Dandridge v. Williams.76 Rodriguez held that the equal protection
clause did not require invalidating a school finance plan which fa-
vored wealthy over poor school districts. Dandridge held that a wel-
fare plan which awarded less benefits per child for children in large
families was not prohibited by the equal protection clause.
These cases seem to indicate that to the extent that an equal
protection assertion involves economic distribution, it has an addi-
tional burden to bear. But of course federal constitutional litigation
is not the only arena for such issues. A number of state supreme
courts77 have come to conclusions different from that of Rodzguez
under their own constitutions. Congress has adopted some redistrib-
utive legislation and at least to some extent, probably will continue
to in the future. In so fluid a situation, judicial attitudes with regard
to the constitutional aspects of such questions are far from foreclosed.
75 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
76 397 U.S. 471 (1970).
77 See Serrano v. Priest, 5 Cal. 3d 584 (1971); Robinson v. Cahill, 70 N.J. 155 (1976).
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